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SOME VIEWS RESPECTING THE FEDERAL
WATER POWER ACT
By MOSEs HooPER*
This Act is entitled
"An Act to create a Federal Power Commission; to provide
for the improvement of navigation; the development of water
power; the use of the public lands in relation thereto, and to
repeal section 18 of the River and Harbor Appropriation Act,
approved August 8, 1917, and for other purposes." (41 Stat.
lO63, 192o Ch. 285).
No doubt it is competent to Congress to take charge of, and
legislate concerning, waters powers, parcel of the public domain;
and concerning the use for purposes of navigation, interstate and
foren of all navigabl rivers within the territory of the United
States. So far as the Act relates to these purposes no criticism
is intended.
But does not the Act in terms extend beyond such purposes;
and in terms apply to the water powers of navigabl rivers not
parcel of the public domain; and if so, are such parts of the
Act, as so extend, valid?
It is quite plain that the Act assumes Federal property in, and
right of Federal control over the water powers of all navigabl
rivers in the United States whether such powers ar parcel of the
public domain or not. Many of its provisions can rest only on
such assumption.
The title of the Act itself leads to such a view of its scope.
It says that it is "An Act * * to provide for * * the develop-
ment of water powers" without any limitation as to what water
power.
*Member of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, Bar.
NoTE-At the request of the writer, this article is published with reformed
spelling. See circular, No. 8, x893 United States Bureau of Education.
-Ed.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Subdivision (d) of Section 4 purports to giv the Commission
authority to license applicants to construct and operate dams
and other project works for utilization of power "in any of the
navigable waters of the United States."
Section Io (a) and (c) provide for the supervision of the
works by the Commission to the effect that they shal not only
be fit for navigation, but that they also be fit for water power
development.
Section Io (d), (e) and Section 12, 13 and 14 seem to be
framed for the purpose of enabling the Federal Government to
make gain out of the development of the water power of navigabl
streams not parcel of the public domain, and eventually to take
such power over to itself.
Section 14 provides for such taking over "upon not less than
two years' notice * * after the expiration of any license." The
only limitation on the term of the license is that it must be "for
the period of not exceeding fifty years," as provided by Section 6.
Sections 25 and 26 declare severe penalties agenst any persons
who shal refuse to comply with any of the provisions of the Act.
Let us consider the interest of the United States in, and its
authority over, the water powers of navigabl rivers not parcel of
the public domain.
PuBLIcI JURIS
There seems to hay arisen some vague idea that in some way
water power, like navigation, is a soveren right, and not a
purely property right. This seems to be held as a progressiv
idea,-a new idea. It would seem to be a socialistic idea,-
an outgrowth of the Henry George philosophy that there can
properly be no private ownership of natural resources. The idea
is not new. It is nearly a hundred years old and exploded.
In Williams vs. Morland (2 Barn & Cress. 91o) (Eng. Reprint
Vol. lO7 page 620 at 621) (9 E. C. L. R. 39) (1824), Justice
Bailey says
"Flowing water is originally publici juris." "The party
who obtains a right to the exclusive enjoyment of the water,
does so in derogation of the primitive right of the public."
(913).
Justice Hoyroyd says "Running water is not in its nature
private property." (914).
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Justice Littledale says, "All the King's subjects have the right
to the use of flowing water." (917).
Blackstone says, "But after all there are some few things
which * must still unavoidably remain in common * * such
(among others) are the elements of light, air and water." (Book
II. page 4).
"For water is a movable, wandering thing and must of neces-
sity continue common by the law of nature." (Book II. p. 18).
But as actual water power development came about this rule
failed to meet the exigency. Williams vs. Morland was over-
ruled by the King's Bench in 1833 by Mason vs. Hill (5 Barn &
Ad I) (ioo Eng. Reprint 692) (27 E. C. L. R. ii). Therein
Lord Denman said
"The possessor of land through which a natural stream
runs has a right to the advantage of that stream and to use
it when he pleases for any purpose of his own not inconsistent
with a similar right in the proprietors of the land above and
below." (27 E. C. L. R. 19).
All the associate judges concurred.
In 1851 the question came before the Court of Exchequer in
E-mbray vs. Owen (6 Exch. 353). Therein Baron Park, refer-
ring to Kent's Commentaries and some American decisions said
"Each proprietor of the adjacent land has the right to the
usufruct of the stream which flows through it." (368).
This rule has since that day been held to be the law of England.'
That the water power of a navigabl stream is the private
property of the riparian owner has been repeatedly adjudicated in
contentions between private parties in American Courts both
State and Federal.'
Kimberly and Clark Company vs. Hewitt related to the water
power of the lower Fox River, a public navigabl stream. Therein
Justice Lyon said
'Sampson vs. Hodinot, 87 E. C. L. R. 59o, 61o (1857); Swindon Water
Works vs. Wilts and Burks Canal, L. R. 7 E. & I. App. 697 (1875);
Hamelin vs. Bannerman, ii R. 368 (1895); Hindson vs. Ashby, - Ch. i
(x896); Coulson and Forbes, pp. 113 to 116 (192).
'State: Kaukauna W. P. Co. vs. G. B. & M. Canal Co., 75 Wis. 385
(i8o) ; Kimberly and Clark Co. vs. Hewitt, 79 Wig. 333 (i8gi) ; West vs.
Foxr River Paper Company, 82 Wis. 647 (892); Federal: Holyoke W.
P. Co. vs. Conn. River Co., 52 Conn. 570 (1884); Same case, 2D Fed. Rep.
71 (I884) ; Ka. W. P. Co. vs. G. B. & Al. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254 (89i).
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"The rule is elementary that unless affected by license
grant, prescription or public right, or the like, every pro-
prietor of land on the bank of a stream of water, whether
navigable or not, has the right to the use of the water as it
is wont to run, without material alteration or diminution";
(337).
Language to practically the same effect is used in each of the
other cases cited in Note 2.
Many cases hay arisen wherein the riparian claim came in
conflict with the public claim, or the claim publici juris.3 Uni-
formly the adjudication has sustained the riparian claim.
In Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Company vs. Kau. W. P
Co., Justice Lyon said of the riparian on the lower Fox, a public
navigabl river,
"He has the right, however, to pass from his land to the
river, and from the river to his land, and to utilize the waters
of the river upon his land for any purpose not interfering
with the navigation of the stream or the rights of other
riparian owners." (653).
Whether water power is publici juris or private property was
distinctly at issue between the State of New York and a grantee
of the State of Massachusetts in Commissioners vs. Kemnpshall
(26 Wend. 404) (1841).
By Treaty in 1786, New York granted to Massachusetts the
"estate, right, title and property in and to" a large tract of land
in the western part of that state reserving "only the right and title
of government, sovereignty and jurisdiction." The Genessee
River, a public navigabl stream runs thru this tract. Kempshall
was a riparian on this river under grant from Massachusetts. A
contention arose between him and the State of New York as to
whether the water power of the river was publici juris and hence
within the reservation, or private property of the riparian and
hence within the grant. Held by the New York Court to be
' Walker vs. Board of Public Works, z6 Oh. 540, 543-4 (1847) ; Exparte
Jennings, 6 Cow. 519, 528, 536 (1826) ; Canal Coinrs vs. The State, 5 Wernd.
423, 444, 447-8 (183o); Varick vs. Smith, 5 Paige Chancery, 137 (1835);
Canal Codrs vs. The State, 13 Wend. 32 (1835); Canal Com'rs vs. Kemp-
shall, 26 Wend. 404, 413 (1841); People vs. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y.
461 (1865); Chenango Bridge Co. vs. Paige, 83 N. Y. 178, 185-6 (88o);
G. B. & M. C. Co. vs. Kau. W. P. Co., 7o Wis. 635, 652 (1888).
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private property of the riparian. The syllabus in the report
reads thus
"Fresh-water rivers, to the middle of the stream, belong to
the owners of the adjacent banks. If 'navigable,' the right
of the owners is subject to the 'servitude of the public in-
terest' for passage or navigation. The owners, however, are
entitled to the usufruct of the waters flowing in the rivers, as
appurtenant to the fee of the adjoining banks."
The same question arose agen in Smith vs. Rochester (92 N. Y.
463) (1883). Decision the same. Opinion by Chief Justice
Ruger.
The most important water power contention in Wisconsin and,
perhaps, in the United States, was The Water Power Cases (148
Wis. 124). The question,--Who owns the Water Power of
public navigabl rivers, the State or the riparians?-was raised
directly between the State and the riparians.
In 1911, the Legislature of Wisconsin enacted Chapter 652.
This Act declared that
"All energy developed or undeveloped of the navigable
waters of this state is subject to the control of the state for
the public good.
The beneficial use and natural energy of the navigable
waters of this state for all public uses are held by the state in
trust for all of the people."
The Act directed the Railroad Commission and other State
officers to enforce its provisions.
This legislation was challenged by the riparians. They com-
menced an action in the State Supreme Court against the Rail-
road Commission and other State officers to restrain them from
attempting to enforce the provisions of the Act. Justice Timlin,
expressing the opinion of the unanimous Court, said
"The right of the riparian owner to use the water of the
river on his own land within his boundary, determined by
ordinary high water mark, for the purpose of creating power,
or as the act in question puts it, developing energy, returning
the water again to the stream, is unquestionably a private
right, appurtenant to the riparian land."
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To the same effect are many other decisions, both State and
Federal.
4
The right to use the energy of the falling water, or the right
to the water power is, like the right of access and departure, held
to be incident to the ownership of the bank of the stream. It
does not depend upon the ownership of the bed. It is, as its name
indicates, a bank right.5 Being such, it necessarily belongs to
the owner of the bank. How can a bank right be a public right
unless the public owns the bank?
Water power is held by the Courts to be not an easement but
the body of the estate inseparably annext to the soil itself.6 How,
then, can the water power, parcel of the soil, be ownd by the
public unles the public owns the soil?
This rule holds good on public navigabl streams as well as on
private streams.
7
'State: Walker vs. Board of Public Works, 16 Oh. 540 (847); Minn.
vs. Milling Co., 26 Minn. 229 (1879) ; Federal: Holyoke vs. Conn. River
Co., 52 Conn. 570 (1884); Same case 2o Fed. Rep. 71 (1884); Kau. W. P.
Co. vs. G. B. & M. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254 (1891).
'Fox River Paper Company vs. Kelly, 70 Wis. 287, 294-5, 298 (1887);
State vs. Milling Company, 26 Minn. 222, 227-8-9 (1879) ; Canal Com'rs vs.
Kempshfall, 26 Wend. 404, 418-9 (1841); Walker vs. Board of Public
Works, 16 Oh. 540 (1847); U. S. vs. Ch. D. W. P. Co., 209 U. S. 447
(I908) ; Coulson & Forbes, 62-3-4; Coulson & Forbes, 11O-1-2; Gould on
Waters, Sec. r48; Farnham on Waters, Vol. 2, See. 463, pages 1568-9-;
So are the adjudged cases too numerous to cite.
'Johnson vs. Jordan, 43 Masg. 234; Cary vs. Daniels, 49 Mass. 466, 48o
(1844); Standen vs. New Rochells Water Company, 91 Hun. 272, 36
N. Y. S. 92 (1895); Tourtellot vs. Phelps, 70 Mass, 370, 376 (1855);
Gould vs. Boston Duck Company, 79 Mass. 442, 450 (1859); Parker vs.
Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 299 (1845); Crittenton vs. Alger, 52 Mass. 281
(I846) ; Blanchard vs. Baker, 8 Maine, 253 (1832) ; Tillotson vs. Smith,
32 N. H. 90, 94 (1855); Keeney & Wood Mfg. Co. vs. Union Mfg. Co.,
39 Conn. 576, 582 (1873); Brown vs. Bush, 45 Pa. St. 61 (1863); Gould
on Waters, Section 204.
"Morrill vs. St. Anthony's Falls W. P. Co., 26 Minn. 222, Mississippi
River (1879); G. B. & M. Canal Co. vs. Kaukauna W. P. Co., 70 Wis.,
635, 64, 653, Lower Fox (1888); Kaukauna W. P. Co. vs. G. B. & M.
Canal Co., 75 Wis., 385, 390, Lower Fox (189o); Kimberly & Clark Com-
pany vs. Hewitt, 79 Wis., 334, Lower Fox (18g1); Kaukauna W. P. Co. vs.
G. B. & M. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254, 275 Lower Fox (I89I) ; Varick vs.
Smith, 9 Paige, 547; Walker vs. Board of Public Works, I6 Oh. 540, 543-4
(1847); Lewis on Eminent Domain, Vol. I, Secs. 61, 69; Avery vs. Fox,
2 Fed. Cas. No. 674, 3rd, 4th and 5th columns (1868); Holyoke W. P. Co.
vs. Conn. River Co., 52 Conn. 570 (1884).
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If water power wer in its nature public then why does not a
stream furnishing it becum public irrespectiv of navigability?
We call a river furnishing navigation public becaus it meets the
public use,--navigation. Why then, if water power is publici
juris, should we not call a river furnishing water power public
becaus it meets a public use, to-wit, water power?
In that case the question woud seem to be, not simply-Does
the State or the riparian own the water power of a public stream?
but-Does the State or the riparian own the water power of all
streams; and ar all streams capabl of furnishing power public?
STATE OR FEDERAL CONTROL
But for the purposes of the argument, let us suppose that Mr.
Henry George is right,-that there shoud be no private ownership
of natural resources; and that we hay so far developed that
society recognizes that water power is publici juris. What then is
the situation? Who controls the water powers of public rivers
not parcel of the public domain? Does the State control or the
Federal Government?
Let us consider the question in the case of one of the original
thirteen states. Take Massachusetts. Before the Confederation,
the State of Massachusetts was, and stil is, a soveren. The water
powers of that state wer the property of either the riparian or the
soveren state of Massachusetts. There coud be no other owner-
ship or right of control. If now the United States has acquired
any right of property in, or soveren control over, the same, that
right must hay passed from the State of Massachusetts directly or
by inference thru some provision of the Articles of Confederation
or the Federal Constitution. There is no suggestion of surrender
of soverenty in the Articles of Confederation.
The only surrender by the States to the Federal Government of
soveren control of rivers grows out of the simpl provision of the
Constitution granting to Congress the right "to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations and among the several states" (Art. I.
Sec. 8, clause 3). Otherwise than so far as necessary to that end,
'Marftn vs. Waddell, 41 U. S. 367, 410 (1842); Penna. vs. Wheeling
Bridge Co., 54 U. S. 518, 582-3 (1851); Penna. vs. Wheeling Bridge Co.,
59 U. S. 421, 430 (1855); Shively vs. Bozvlby, 152 U. S. I, 40 (1894);
Water Power Co. vs. Water Com'rs, 168 U. S. 349, 358 (8o7) ; Leovy vs.
U. S., 177 U. S. 621, 632-3 (18g9).
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Congress has no control over rivers. Beyond that the control
rests with the State and the riparian.s
In Martin vs. Waddell, Chief Justice Taney says,
"For when the revolution took place, the people of each
state became themselves sovereign; and in that character
hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the
soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to.
the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general
government." (4o)
In Shively vs. Bowlby, Mr. Justice Gray says,
"Such title to the shore and lands under water is regarded
as incidental to the sovereignty of the State-a portion of the
royalties belonging thereto, and held in trust for the public
purposes of navigation and fishery-and cannot be retained
or granted out to individuals by the United States." (46)
In Water Pozver Company vs. Water Com'rs, Mr. Justice Peck-
ham reaffirms the statement made by Chief Justice Taney in
Martin vs. Waddell and says among other things,
"The jurisdiction of the State over this question of riparian
ownership has been always, and from the foundation of the
government, recognized and admitted by this Court." (366)
The decisions in all the other cases cited in Note 8 ar sub-
stantially equally emfatic, and to the same effect on the point
to which they ar cited.
In 19o7 there was a hearing before Chief Justice Taft, then
Secretary of War, in connection with the development of the
Illinois Valley water power. Application was made to Secretary
Taft requesting him not to take any action in relation to the
Des Plaines River that might affect State action in relation there-
to. The now Chief Justice then said,
"All the United States does, assuming it to be a navigable
stream, is merely to protect the navigation of the stream.
With reference to the water power, it has no function except
in respect to water power which it itself creates by its own
investment in property that it itself owns.
"It is not that we approve this :-It is not that we disap-
prove it. It is that we have nothing whatever to do with it."
(Report of Sub Committee on Dams and Water Power
Second Session, 6oth Congress, Feb. 25, 1909, pages 37-38).
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Mr. Rome G. Brown9 says in relation to Federal control of
water powers,
"Obviously, also, as the power of regulation can extend no
further than that which is expressed in the Federal Constitu-
tion, the right of regulation of the highway streams is limited
to what is necessary to protect the interests of navigation.
Beyond that, and subject to such limited Federal power, the
power of regulation and other legislative functions with re-
spect to water powers belong to the respective states." (Yale
L. J. Nov., 1914, pp. i8 & 19).
The same rule of relative authority that holds in case of Mas-
sachusetts must, no doubt, hold in any of the states admitted to
the Union, on account of the conditions on which they were
admitted.
The first state admitted to the Union was Vermont, admitted on
March 4, 1791 "as a new and entire member" (i Stat. 191).
The second was Kentucky, admitted on June 1, 1792 "as a new
and entire member" (i Stat. i89).
On July 13 the Ordinance of 1787 was adopted for the govern-
ment of the territory * * northwest of the River Ohio (i Stat.
51, 53). Section 5 of that Ordinance provided for the admission
of states, carved out of that territory, "on an equal footing with
the original states in all respects whatever."
Tennessee was the third state admitted. This was on June i,
1796. Act admitting used the same language as the Ordinance of
1787--"on an equal footing with the original states in all respects
whatever." (i Stat. 491).
The acts admitting states since 1787 hav adopted substantially,
and for the most part identically, the same language.
The Federal Supreme Court holds that the States admitted
came in with the same rights respecting public navigabl waters as
the original thirteen had.10
Mr. Brown said
"Why is it that in these recent years * * there has been,
comparatively speaking, no water power development in the
United States * * ?
9 Lecturer on the Law of Water Rights in the University of Minnesota
Law School and in the Minnesota College of Law.
'Shively vs. Bondby, 152 U. S. 1, 27 (893); Water Power Co. vs.
Water Corn'rs, 168 U. S. 349, 358-9 (897).
9
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"The cause is the halting, capricious, unreasonable and
sometimes supersentimental attitude toward the water power
question which is assumed by the Federal and State legis-
latures." (Yale L. 1. November, 1914, pp. 12, 13).
What Mr. Brown woud say to-day relativ to the retarding of
water power development by legislativ control, I do not know.
But my opinion is that the same cause stil operates to the same
effect tho not to the same degree.
